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Abstract— This paper aims to provide a framework to model 
human belief and misperception in helicopter overland 
navigation. Helicopter overland navigation is known to be a 
challenging cognitive task, and understanding the cognitive 
processes associated with it is non-trivial. Two sets of human-in-
the-loop experiments were conducted to investigate pilot 
misperception during simulated overland navigation by 
analyzing actual navigation trajectory, pilots’ alleged location, 
and corresponding confidence levels. No significant correlation 
between perceived and actual location of the aircraft was found, 
indicating that confidence is not a good indicator of performance.  
There is however some evidence that there is a negative 
correlation between perceived location and intended route of 
flight, suggesting that there is a perception bias towards the 
intended flight route. Observed visual misperception can be 
summarized into: 1) confusion between inference and evidence, 
2) incorrect mutually exclusive assumptions on the data, and 3) 
biased sampling. Simulation results on two cases observed in the 
experiments are given. Quantitative differences in dynamic 
perceptions between a Bayesian agent and misperceiving humans 
are presented with the suggested modeling framework.  
Keywords- mispercetion; visual perception; Bayesian modeling; 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In many different disciplines such as psychology, 
neuroscience, and cognitive engineering, research efforts have 
been focused on understanding human perception. Overland 
navigation is made up of a number of sub-skills that require 
continuous visual cue perception and decision making. “The 
Pilot Not At the Controls (PNAC) is primarily responsible for 
accurate navigation. He must remain oriented at all times, 
monitor cockpit instruments and perform assigned cockpit 
duties as briefed. Because of the complex cognitive task placed 
on the nonflying aviator, it is easy to deviate from course.  
Among the four different awareness states of a navigating pilot, 
the most concerning area is marked “Dangerous” [1], where the 
crew believes that they are on course when they are not. This 
type of misperception can lead to both mission failure by the 
aircraft not reaching its intended destination on time and also 
mishaps due to the pilot flying into obstacles in the terrain. 
This extended abstract is an excerpt from [1], [2] and [3]. 
II. MODELING OF VISUAL MISPERCEPTION IN A HELICOPTER 
OVERLAND NAVIGATION TASK 
Twelve military officers who varied in flight expertise as 
defined by total flight hours participated in the first experiment. 
Their gaze parameters were tracked via two eye tracking 
systems while subjects were looking at out-the-window (OTW) 
and topographic map views in a fixed based helicopter 
simulator.  Flight performance measures were not predicted by 
the expertise level of pilots. However, gaze parameters and 
scan management skills were predicted by the expertise level. 
For every additional 1000 flight hours, on average, the model 
predicted the median dwell will decrease 28 msec and the 
number of view changes will increase 33 times. However, 
more experienced pilots scanned more OTW than novice pilots, 
which was contrary to our expectation. A visualization tool 
(FEST: Flight and Eye Scan visualization Tool) to replay 
navigation tasks and corresponding gaze data was developed. 
Qualitative analysis from FEST revealed visual scan patterns of 
expert pilots, not only looking ahead on the map but also 
revisiting areas on the map they just flew over to retain 
confidence in their orientation. 
Observations from the first experiment suggest that pilots 
(especially with less experience) tend to perceive these OTW 
cues in a biased way, favoring their prior beliefs. Instead of 
making a fair estimate, some pilots seemed to choose the 
location they need to navigate rather than considering other 
possible locations. Some believed what they expected instead 
of what they saw. Some only sampled visual cues in view 
which were compatible with their current belief and 
disregarded cues that did not fit with their current belief.  
Suppose a navigating pilot updates his belief and/or 
confidence on his position whenever he sees salient terrain 
features, i.e., visual cues. The terrain features in the pilot’s 
sights are information (d) provided to the pilot, who infers 
his/her current position (H) based on the data. Thus, the 
probability of a pilot’s current position being at a planned 
waypoint after seeing a valley (i.e., hills on the left and right) 
can be obtained by applying Bayes’ rule. 
                  (1) 
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where p(H) is the pilot’s belief probability before seeing the 
scene d, (i.e., hills on the left and right), p(d|H) is the 
conditional probability that the pilot sees the scene when pilot 
is at a planned waypoint , and p(d|~H) is the conditional 
probability that the pilot sees the same scene when the pilot is 
in the other valley. For simplicity, we only consider two 
possible hypotheses: locations H and ~H respectively, as 
described in the previous paragraph. Then, we have p(~H) = 1௅ 
p(H). Both valleys have hills on the left and right, and the pilot 
is equally likely to see the terrain features when the pilot is at 
the planned waypoint (H) or in the other valley (~H).  Then, 
                                   (2) 
If a pilot realizes this fact, his posterior belief p(H|d) should 
be unchanged from his prior belief p(H).  An elementary 
calculation yields p(H|d) = p(H) from Bayes’ rule. However, 
our experiments showed that the initial bias not only carried on, 
but also amplified favoring the initial bias.  
This bias was especially obvious for less experienced 
pilots; they seemed to believe what they expected to see instead 
of what they actually saw. This misperception can be explained 
by three human errors. First, pilots experienced confusion 
between inference p(H|d) and evidence p(d|H) especially when 
p(d|H) is high. Because pilots already believed that they were 
on-track and the scene was a very likely cue, i.e., p(d|H) § 1, 
they approximated p(H|d) § p(d|H) § 1, which is not a correct 
estimation. These pilots chose an easy, inaccurate 
approximation instead of inferring in a non-biased manner. 
This confusion pushed the initial bias the wrong way. 
Second, pilots could incorrectly assume mutually exclusive 
events from the evidence, i.e., p(d|~H) =1 – p(d|H)  as opposed 
to the correct assumption shown in Eq. (2) p(d|H) = p(d|~H) § 
1. The terrain feature they see is neither a unique nor an 
exclusive visual cue, rather it has multiple solutions. However, 
pilots sometimes overweighed the visual cue favoring their 
initial bias: they did not consider the possibility of the visual 
cue being from another valley (~H). 
Third, pilots sampled data in a biased manner as in 
inattentional blindness [4]. They disregarded cues which were 
not compatible with their current belief. They did not update 
their belief when the OTW view included visual cues 
incompatible with their current hypothesis. However, when 
they were given a compatible cue, they used the cue to solidify 
their possibly wrong hypothesis as shown in the two previous 
misperception types. These visual perception patterns were 
observed through the whole navigation experiment, and Table I 
summarizes visual misperception modeling of these errors.   
TABLE I.  VISUAL MISPERCEPTION MODELING [1] 
Mispercept
ion Type Posterior probability 
Type 1  
                    
Type 2  
Type 3  
                        
 
III. NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE AND CONFIDENCE 
In the second experiment where fifteen pilots participated, 
subjects were “On-track” and had a corresponding high 
confidence 58.4% of the time, but the second most frequent 
state was the dangerous quadrant, “Off-track” yet still 
confident that they are “On-track”. When pilots were “Off-
track”, their perception was wrong 77.9% of the time. This 
observation was more explicit in auto-navigation scenarios. 
The results confirm pilots’ biased perception toward the 
intended route. Error 1 and Error2 are defined as a Great Circle 
distance between 1) perceived and actual location and 2) 
perceived and intended location respectively. No significant 
correlation between pilots’ confidence and Error1 was found 
whereas negative significant correlation (ȡ=-0.65, Spearman’s 
Rank Correlation Coefficient) was found between pilots’ 
confidence and Error2 as shown in Fig. 1. Our exploratory 
analysis also showed that experts pilots with more total-flight-
hours were actually in the “dangerous” quadrant more than 
novice pilots, yet both were fairly close. 
 
Figure 1.  Pilots’ confidence vs. Error2 (Great Circle distance between 
perceived and intended location).  
If aviation personnel can proactively identify the circumstances 
in which usual misperception occur in navigation, they may 
reduce mission failure and mishap rate.  Fleet squadrons and 
instructional commands can benefit from this study, especially 
for use in search and rescue, anti-surface warfare, combat 
search and rescue, and naval special warfare operations 
because of the low-level navigation flight profiles required.  
This study can also improve crew resource management inside 
the helicopter cockpit.  Helicopter crews are heavily reliant on 
each member of the crew, and additional complacency can 
occur when one of the members is confident that they are on 
course.  
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